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The “Primary Purpose” of Children’s
Advocacy Centers: How Ohio v. Clark
Revolutionized Children’s Hearsay
Andrew Lentz*
INTRODUCTION

Will never doubted that what his three-year-old daughter was
telling him was true.1 He asked her questions again and again—
careful not to volunteer any leading information—hoping Ashley’s
story would change. Will hoped he was wrong, that it was a
mistake, and he had simply misheard Ashley. Then all he would
have to do is ask one more time, and Will and his wife, Stephanie,
would realize they misunderstood Ashley, and it would be over. It
would be a weird way to end the day, but that was all, nothing
more sinister. But Ashley’s words did not change, and they could
not be taken back.
Over several months’ time, Ashley had begun exhibiting
regressive behaviors. This was unusual, but not alarming in
itself. During the car ride home from Will’s parents’ home (Papi
and Nana), Ashley put into words what she had been saying for
the past several months. Will was driving when Ashley voiced her
displeasure with Papi.
“I don’t like it when Papi hugs and kisses me.”
Stephanie responded, “Why not?”
* Candidate for J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, 2018.
For my wife and partner in all things, Sara Lentz. I am grateful for the
many sacrifices you made throughout this process. For some reason, you
always believe in me. My soul sings when I am with you.
1 This is a true story as told by Will. Both parents gave the author
permission to re-tell their story here. Pseudonyms are used to protect the
privacy of those involved in the story.
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“He touched my bottom and it hurts on the inside.”
“Where did he touch your bottom?”
“In the front.”
“Where were you when your bottom was hurt?”
“In [Ashley’s uncle]’s room, in the big bed.”
“Who touched your bottom?” Will attempted to clarify.
“Papi did, and it bleeds.”
“Where were you?”
“In [Ashley’s uncle]’s room, and I asked for my brown
blanket.”
Periodically, as the night went on, Will and Stephanie asked
Ashley more about the details of what happened. Despite their
hopes that Ashley’s story would change into some innocent
mistake, she remained consistent. Throughout the night, they
asked her about five times what happened. Ashley reiterated,
“Papi touches my bottom, I bleed.” At one point, Ashley
volunteered that she had been wearing her Little Mermaid
panties, and she fetched them for Will and Stephanie.
Will woke up the next morning wondering if the next phone
call he made would tear his family apart, and effectively sever his
relationship with his dad. His call to the police turned into a
referral to the local Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC). Things
moved quickly, but soon became disappointing. Ashley met with a
forensic interviewer, but did not disclose any abuse during her
interview. A forensic medical examination was conducted on-site,
but despite the expertise of the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner
(SANE), the exam was a horrendous experience for Ashley.
Unfortunately, the medical exam did not produce any evidence
about whether or not Ashley was assaulted. The investigators
met with Will and Stephanie and told them that without a
statement from Ashley to the forensic interviewer, there was very
little that they could do. The investigators attempted to use the
other tools they had available to them. For instance, a “controlled
call”2 between Will and his father proved fruitless, and they tried
to conduct a polygraph examination on Papi, but he refused. Soon
thereafter, Will received a call from the investigators who told him
that, without more evidence, they would have to put his case “on
2. A controlled call is when a participant agrees to call the suspect
while an officer listens and records the conversation.
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delay.”3
Unlike the criminal justice system, there is not an option to
put real life “on delay.”4 The purpose of sharing Will’s family
story is not to tug at heartstrings; in the realm of child sexual
abuse, his family’s story is not particularly heinous. The purpose
is to illustrate how allegations of sexual abuse have almost
intrinsic power to pull close relationships apart.5 Sexual abuse
allegations by young children are almost as likely to be against a
family member as anyone else.6 But the consequences for a
parent to listen to his or her child and believe him or her are
staggering. A parent is faced with a decision to either ignore the
report of abuse—potentially increasing the chance that his or her
child will be re-victimized—or report the abuse and face lasting
relational consequences. The only guidance offered to parents in
this situation is that reporting abuse is the “right thing to do.”
But even if a parent reports the abuse to the authorities, obtaining
justice in criminal court is especially difficult because there is
often little evidence beyond the child’s initial statement, and
courts are inherently not child-friendly.7 For example, a criminal
trial can take a great deal of time; thus, a witness may have to
wait for multiple days at the courthouse before giving his or her
testimony. Trials can also be confusing; there are a lot of
important people there, and some people just sit and watch
everything you say. Testifying at trial is difficult, even for adults.
For children, it can be especially paralyzing. Ultimately, a
caregiver’s option to report abuse feels like a futile exercise that
requires a public statement about a private, humiliating

3. No new information has come to light in the intervening years, so
the case remains “on delay.”
4. In the aftermath, Will’s siblings distanced themselves from Papi, and
within a year Will’s parents had divorced. The family has not had a great
deal of contact with Papi following the incident. Will and Stephanie have
since had a son together, and he has never met Papi.
5. See HOWARD N. SNYDER, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEXUAL
ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM,
INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 10 (2000) (finding that 86% of
offenders of sexual abuse knew the victims before the abuse as either a
family member or an acquaintance).
6. Id. (49% of offenders of children under the age of six are family
members).
7. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 683 (Foundation Press, 3d ed. 2013).
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experience for their entire family.8
Unfortunately, recent case law has restricted the alternative
evidentiary methods that were designed to make children’s
statements admissible at trial.9 In an attempt to refine its
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
significantly narrowed the kinds of child abuse cases that may be
prosecuted.10
But questions abound, such as: Is the Sixth Amendment
working as intended, and does our current system reflect the rules
as they existed when they were written? Is there any light at the
end of the tunnel for reticent children who are victims of abuse?
In Part I of this Comment, I will discuss the concept of
“testimonial evidence,” and where it originated from. Then I will
present how the meaning of “testimonial evidence” has evolved
since Crawford v. Washington11 up until Ohio v. Clark.12 I will
discuss Clark, and how a few courts have examined evidence in
child abuse cases post-Clark. In Part II, I will explore an
exception to the Sixth Amendment for evidence that was
admissible at the time of the founding. I will then provide
examples of out-of-court statements made by children around the
time of the founding. Next, I will compare those statements with
our current understanding of “testimonial evidence.” In Part III, I
will apply Clark’s revised test for “testimonial evidence” to
frontline workers at CACs. I will analyze how the recent iteration
of the “primary purpose” test will affect how frontline workers
receive information from the children they serve. In short, this
Comment aims to look through the lens of recent opinions about
testimonial evidence and provide advice to frontline workers about
evidence they may come across in the course of their duties. As a
result of recent case law, CACs may play a key role in the future
for obtaining evidence that is admissible at trial. The purpose of
this Comment is to educate workers whose jobs involve working
8. The term “caregiver” is used throughout this Comment to refer to an
adult who provides support for the daily living of another.
9. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
10. When the Supreme Court declares a procedural requirement for all
accusations as “a crucible,” it is unsurprising that it disproportionately
affects children. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. Few crucibles are childfriendly.
11. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
12. 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).
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with suspected victims of child maltreatment about recent cases
that will influence the performance of their jobs, and to
demonstrate that many statements, although made by a child,
might not violate the Confrontation Clause.
I.

HISTORY OF TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE

A. Introducing “Testimonial Evidence” (Crawford, Davis, and
Bryant)
In 2004, the landscape of the Sixth Amendment shifted
considerably. The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause
states “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”13 Prior
to 2004, Ohio v. Roberts admitted out-of-court statements made by
an unavailable witness if those statements showed an “adequate
‘indicia of reliability.’”14 While Roberts was the standard for
twenty-four years, it often granted serenity at the cost of
consistency.15
In an effort to return the Amendment back to its original
purpose, the Supreme Court adopted a different approach16 in
Crawford v. Washington.17 Crawford declared that “witnesses”
are those “who ‘bear testimony,’” and “testimony” is a “solemn
declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact.”18 Crawford held that testimonial evidence
was excluded unless the witness was “unavailable to testify, and
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
15.
Id. at 66; compare United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs.,
259 F.3d 229, 245 (2001) (where the Fourth Circuit found an incriminating
statement more reliable because it was “fleeting”), with People v. Farrell, 34
P.3d 401, 406–07 (Colo. 2001) (where the Colorado Supreme Court applied an
eight-factor test and found a statement that incriminated the defendant more
reliable because it was “detailed”), and Nowlin v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d
367, 371–72 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (where the court considered a statement to
be more reliable because the witness was charged with a crime and in
custody), with State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002)
(where the court found a statement to be more reliable because the witness
was neither a suspect nor charged with a crime).
16.
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2184 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).
That phrase may sound mild, but this new approach marked a significant
change in the law of evidence.
17. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
18. Id. at 51 (citation omitted).
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the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”19
While Crawford explained the basis for the new test, it did
precious little to offer guidance on how to determine if statements
are “testimonial” beyond including, at a minimum, “prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and to police interrogations.”20
Just two years later, the Supreme Court revisited
“testimonial” statements when it considered two consolidated
cases, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana.21 In an
effort to clarify what “testimonial” meant, the Court announced:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation
is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing
emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.22
But while the Court refined our understanding of
“testimonial” evidence in Davis, the Court’s analysis was
imperfect.23 The focus was supposed to be on the “primary
purpose” test, but the Court must have felt that there was too
19. Id. at 54.
20. See id. at 62, 68.
21. See 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
22. Id. at 822 (footnote omitted). The Court reasoned that statements
made to a 911 operator while a victim was under attack were nontestimonial,
but verbal and written statements to a police officer after a victim suffered a
violent attack from her boyfriend were testimonial, and thus inadmissible.
Notably, there was no consideration of whether the victim in Hammon was
still in an emergency situation. See id. at 829–30. The majority reasoned
that the attack was over by the time the officer arrived, so there was “no
immediate threat to [the victim’s] person.” Id. Only Justice Thomas called
into question whether the attacker posed an ongoing threat to his wife. Id. at
841 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). This
suggestion seemed to gain traction in Ohio v. Clark because whether the
child would be safe in the home with the attacker played an important role in
the Court’s decision. See 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015). One wonders if the
victim’s statements to the police in Hammon would still be considered
testimonial after Clark.
23. See 547 U.S. 813 (2006).

2018]

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND CHILDREN

271

much discussion about “ongoing emergency” because the Court
accepted Michigan v. Bryant five years later.24 In an effort to
refocus the analysis on the primary purpose of the out-of-court
statements, the Court in Bryant ruled, “the existence vel non of an
ongoing emergency is not the touchstone of the testimonial
inquiry.”25 The Court stressed that an ongoing emergency is
“simply one factor” when evaluating the “primary purpose” and
that the inquiry must consider “all of the relevant
circumstances.”26 The relevant circumstances that the Court
considered in Bryant included the formality of the questioning and
whether the statements would conform to any of the standard
rules of hearsay, which are “designed to identify some statements
as reliable.”27 For the Court, the ultimate question was “whether,
in light of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the ‘primary
purpose’ of the conversation was to ‘creat[e] an out-of-court
substitute for trial testimony.’”28 Therefore, the primary purpose
test is objective.
The Supreme Court has also recognized other exceptions to
the Confrontation Clause separate from the “primary purpose”
test. Crawford v. Washington held that the Confrontation Clause
would not hold up to exceptions that were “established at the time
of the founding.”29 The Court explores this further in Giles v.
California, spending nearly as much time analyzing English
common law as modern law.30 One of the exceptions the Court
discusses is forfeiture by wrongdoing, where the witness is absent
because the defendant engaged in conduct to prevent the witness
from testifying.31 The other exception is a dying declaration,
“when every hope of this world is gone: when every motive to
falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most
24. See 562 U.S. 344, 374 (2011) (second emphasis added).
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 366, 369.
27. Id. at 377, 358–59.
28. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015) (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S.
at 358) (alteration in original). Unsurprisingly, the Court found that the
statements made to responding police officers were “nontestimonial” when
made by a victim dying of a gunshot wound in a gas station parking lot. See
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 378.
29. See 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).
30. See 554 U.S. 353, 362–64 (2008).
31. See id. at 359.
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powerful considerations to speak the truth.”32 The Court
ultimately decided not to admit the State’s evidence explicitly
because it was “not an exception established at the time of the
founding.”33 Therefore, there are at least two ways in which outof-court statements will not violate the Sixth Amendment and
thus may be admitted post-Crawford. First, the statements can
be admitted if they are deemed nontestimonial.34 Second, the
statements may be admitted if they fit into exceptions that are
“established at the time of the founding.”35
B. Children and Testimonial Evidence: Clark’s Impact on the
Sixth Amendment
Up to this point, all of the statements that the Court
examined for their testimonial value were made to law
enforcement officers, while potentially testimonial statements
made to private individuals were never considered before the
scrutiny of the Supreme Court.36 This changed when the Court
heard Ohio v. Clark.37 A three-year-old boy went to preschool
with a left eye that appeared bloodshot.38 His teacher asked the
child what happened and the child did not respond initially.39
Under closer inspection, the teacher noticed red marks on the
boy’s face and called over the lead teacher.40 The lead teacher
asked the child, “Who did this? What happened to you?”41 The
child responded with something that sounded like “Dee, Dee.”42
The teacher further inquired whether Dee was “big or little,” and

32. Id. at 397 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 366 (quotations omitted).
34. See 541 U.S. at 50–53.
35. Id. at 54.
36. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011); Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. While the 911
operator in Davis might not have been the police, the Court considered the
operator to be an agent of the police for the purposes of the opinion; without
deciding whether she was considered law enforcement. See 547 U.S. at 823
n.2.
37. See 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015).
38. Id. at 2178.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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the child answered that “Dee is big.”43 The teacher called the
child abuse hotline when she found more injuries under the child’s
shirt.44 The child’s caretaker—who went by the nickname “Dee”—
arrived at the school later to pick up the child and denied causing
the injuries.45 Dee quickly took the child and left the school, but a
social worker tracked them down the next day.46 The child and
his sister were examined, and a physician at a nearby hospital
discovered multiple injuries on the young boy and his sister,
suggesting child abuse.47 Dee was indicted for five counts of
felonious assault, two counts of endangering children, and two
counts of domestic violence.48 At trial, the child victim did not
testify, but the State introduced the statements made to his
teachers as evidence of the defendant’s guilt.49 The defendant
moved to exclude the out-of-court statements, but the trial court
denied the motion and the jury found the defendant guilty on all
but one count.50
The Supreme Court determined that, while statements to
individuals who are not law enforcement officers are not
categorically excluded from the Sixth Amendment’s reach, “such
statements are much less likely to be testimonial than statements
to law enforcement officers.”51 The Court separated private
individuals from law enforcement officers because they are
“someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and
prosecuting criminal behavior.”52
The Court found that the questions about what happened
were asked by the teacher to determine to whom it was safe to
release the abused child; therefore, the statement was made
during an ongoing emergency.53 The Court specifically dismissed
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The jury found Clark not guilty on only one of the assault counts
related to A.T. Id.
51. Id. at 2181.
52. Id. at 2182.
53. Id. at 2181–82. Contra Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822
(2006).
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an argument that the intention to report the abuse—or the fact
that the information could be used in future prosecution—should
cause the statements to be considered “testimonial.”54 The Court
also found that the conversation between the child and his
teachers was an informal, spontaneous conversation; and that the
child’s age nearly precluded the possibility that his statements
could be testimonial.55 Therefore, from an objective perspective,
the primary purpose of the child’s statements were not to provide
evidence for future litigation.56 Every Justice agreed in judgment,
and six Justices joined in the opinion of the Court.57 Further, the
Court went out of its way to express support for a historical
argument that similar statements would have been admissible at
common law.58 The Court’s inclusion of dicta supporting another
theory about how this kind of testimony does not violate the
Confrontation Clause shows the Court’s confidence in allowing
this kind of evidence.59 Significantly, Justice Scalia not only
agreed with the majority’s analysis of the primary purpose,
common law acceptance, testimonial purpose of a very young
child, and analysis of the effect of mandated reporting laws on
private individuals, but also wrote a concurring opinion
emphasizing his agreement.60
C. Post-Clark Decisions: Ward and Barker
Since announcing the decision in Clark, there have been few
appellate decisions across the country that have applied Clark in
cases involving domestic violence. These cases provide a
54. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2183 (finding that mandated reporting laws
alone did not turn a teacher into an agent of the state, and that any good
teacher would have acted in the same way without mandated reporting laws
in place).
55. See id. at 2181–82.
56. See id. at 2182.
57. See id. at 2177.
58. See id. at 2182 (citing Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The
History of Children’s Hearsay: From Old Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L. J.
1029, 1030 (2007)). Because the Court found the statement nontestimonial
under the “primary purpose” test, it was not necessary to explore the common
law argument.
59. See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182 (citations omitted).
60. See id. at 2183–84 (Scalia, J., concurring). While a concurring
opinion is not authoritative, it is hard to overstate the power of a concurring
opinion from the progenitor of the analytical framework that will be changed.
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particularly clear perspective into how the courts will view
testimonial evidence involving child abuse in the future. An
analysis of post-Clark decisions proves particularly interesting in
cases involving forensic nurses because of the ambiguity present
in the performance of their job. Two cases serve as a barometer
for how Clark will be interpreted in the future: Ward v. State61
and United States v. Barker.62 Ward involved a victim of domestic
violence who was dropped off at her parents’ home by her
abuser.63 The victim’s parents called emergency services after
they saw the extent of her injuries.64 When the paramedic
arrived, the responding police officer left the room and the victim
disclosed that her boyfriend caused the injuries.65 The victim was
transported to the hospital and evaluated by a forensic nurse who
asked her what had happened.66 The victim reported that it was
her boyfriend, the defendant, who beat her multiple times with a
belt.67 The Indiana Supreme Court found that the statements to
the paramedic and the forensic nurse were both nontestimonial.68
Barker involved a SANE nurse who testified about a four and a
half year old’s disclosure of sexual abuse to her during a medical
exam.69 The court determined that the child’s statements to the
nurse were also nontestimonial and admissible.70
While both courts decided that the statements made to
forensic nurses were nontestimonial, they arrived at those
conclusions in different ways.71 Both courts evaluated the
questioners’ roles and the medical relevancy of the questions.72
However, the similarities end there. While both discuss “ongoing
emergency” as a factor,73 Ward dismisses an argument that the
emergency was over because the assault occurred hours before
61. 50 N.E.3d 752 (Ind. 2016).
62. 820 F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2016).
63. 50 N.E.3d at 754.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
68. Id. at 764.
69. United States v. Barker, 820 F.3d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 2016). See infra
note 131.
70. Id. at 172.
71. See id. at 171–72; Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 753.
72. See Barker, 820 F.3d at 171–72; Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 761–62.
73. See Barker, 820 F.3d at 171; Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 758.
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medical treatment was obtained.74 Instead, Ward sidesteps the
issue as nonessential to deciding the case,75 and Barker finds an
ongoing emergency.76 Ward interprets Bryant to mean that
because there may be other circumstances, besides an ongoing
emergency, where a statement is made without the primary
purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for testimony, an
ongoing emergency is unnecessary.77 Ward looks to other factors,
like the condition of the victim and the formality of the
conversation, to determine the primary purpose.78 Barker also
distinguishes the hospital room setting from a formal location,
such as a law enforcement interrogation.79 Moreover, Barker
considers, but dismisses, any argument that the principal purpose
for the nurse’s questions was evidence collection.80 Ward finds the
nurse’s questions satisfied the “primary purpose” test because
they were useful for diagnosis and safety planning.81 Notably,
Ward is not dissuaded by the fact that the nurse acquired
informed consent from the victim—in writing—which permitted,
but did not compel, her to disclose the information to law
enforcement if requested.82
74. See Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 760 n.2.
75. See id. at 760 (“[T]here may be other circumstances, aside from
ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a primary
purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” (quoting
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011))).
76. Barker, 820 F.3d at 171.
77. See Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 760.
78. See id.
79. See Barker, 820 F.3d at 172. More analysis on this point by the court
would have been greatly appreciated. There are formal elements to a
hospital, such as that appointments are made there, highly educated people
work there, and security personnel are employed there. However, there are
also informal aspects, such as the absence of a dress code and that
appointments are nonessential for certain departments. Instead, the court
nakedly finds that “a hospital emergency room . . . [is] a more formal
environment than a preschool lunchroom.” Id.
80. Id.
81. See 50 N.E.3d at 762–63. The court finds these questions consistent
with the hospital’s primary goal; “a hospital’s duty of care to a patient who
presents observable signs of domestic abuse includes some reasonable
measures to address the patient’s risk.” Id. at 763 (quoting McSwane v.
Bloomington Hosp. & Healthcare Sys., 916 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ind. 2009)).
82. Id. at 763. Up until this point, the biggest difference between
Hammon v. Indiana and the other cases is that the emergency was over, and
a written statement was taken. See 547 U.S. 813, 814–15 (2006). In Ward,
the forensic nurse obtained consent in writing, and the assault had occurred
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What emerge as key factors in both cases are the identity of
the questioner, as well as some rational connection between the
questions and a non-prosecutorial purpose.83 Both cases
demonstrate testimonial analysis post-Clark, and can serve as a
predictor for how courts may interpret Clark in the future.84
However, the Supreme Court also mentions a possibility for
allowing evidence that has its roots grounded in the past.85
II. CHILD ABUSE HEARSAY DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE

The Supreme Court has recognized that the Confrontation
Clause “does not prohibit the introduction of out-of-court
statements that would have been admissible in a criminal case at
the time of the founding.”86 Clark applies Giles to carve out a
special exception to the Confrontation Clause for children’s
statements about child abuse that ordinarily would be deemed
hearsay.87 Importantly, both the Clark majority and concurring
opinion cite with approval to an article analyzing the common law
approach to hearsay regarding child abuse allegations.88
However, the majority goes further.89 In dicta, the Court opines
that the statements made by the victim likely would have been
admissible at common law, and that “[i]t is thus highly doubtful
that statements like [the victim]’s ever would have been
understood to raise Confrontation Clause concerns.”90 The
hours before. See 50 N.E.3d at 763. According to this analysis, the main
difference in Hammon was the identity of the questioner, or simply the
testimonial analysis has changed. See 547 U.S. at 815. Little else seems
substantially different.
83. See Barker, 820 F.3d at 172; Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 763.
84. See Barker, 820 F.3d at 172; Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 763.
85. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180 (2015) (citing Giles v.
California, 554 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2008)).
86. See id.
87. See id. at 2182.
88. See id. at 2181; id. at 2184 (Scalia, J., concurring); Lyon & LaMagna,
supra note 58, at 1029.
89. Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181 (opining in dicta that no previous case law
has amounted to an assertion that defendants must provide “evidence that
the adoption of the Confrontation Clause was understood to require the
exclusion of evidence that was regularly admitted in criminal cases at the
time of the founding.”).
90. Id. at 2182.
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Supreme Court cites approvingly to King v. Brasier, in which an
English court ruled that a child’s statements to her mother should
have been excluded—not because the statements were
inadmissible—but because the child was competent to testify, yet
she did not.91 Therefore, Brasier stands to mean that if a child
was unavailable to testify, then his or her statements could be
heard.92 Thus, the statements were not considered a violation of
the hearsay rules. The Old Bailey Session Papers (OBSP) shed
more light on trial practice in England in the eighteenth
century.93 For instance, in Ketteridge a child was unable to
testify, so her mother was sworn in.94 The mother was allowed to
testify about what her daughter disclosed to her about the
defendant’s identity, actions, and about the child’s statements
made in an initial court appearance.95 Importantly, Ketteridge
was adjudicated in September, while Brasier was decided in April,
only a few months prior.96 Therefore, even though Brasier
excluded some testimony by a parent about her child’s statements
concerning abuse, it did not categorically exclude hearsay
testimony by parents.97 Additionally, in 1775, in a different child
abuse trial, the court allowed an alleged victim’s mother to testify
extensively about her child’s statements without the child
testifying.98 The mother testified as to what the child told her,
specifically how the defendant allegedly sexually abused the child,
where the alleged abuse occurred, how many times, and when it
happened.99 The defendant objected to the mother’s testimony as
91. See id. at 2182 (citing King v. Brasier (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 202
(K.B.)).
92. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 203.
93. The OBSP are a collection of 197,745 criminal trials held in a court
in London spanning from 1674 to 1913. THE OLD BAILEY PROCEEDINGS
ONLINE, 1674–1913, https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ (last visited Sep. 17,
2017).
94. Trial of Charles Ketteridge, THE OLD BAILEY PROCEEDINGS ONLINE,
1674–1913, https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ (last visited Sep. 17, 2017)
(search reference number t17790915-18 in “search the proceedings” engine).
95. Id.
96. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202; Trial of Charles Ketteridge, supra note
94.
97. See Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202.
98. See Lyon & LaMagna, supra note 58, at 1036–37 (citing Rex v.
Powell (1775) 168 Eng. Rep. 157 (K.B.)).
99. See id.
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unreliable because the statements were not taken under oath.100
However, the court ruled against the defendant’s objection and
admitted the hearsay from the mother.101 Nevertheless, these are
just two cases among many others from that time.102 They show
that out-of-court statements by children about abuse were
routinely admitted in criminal cases in eighteenth century
English courts. Therefore, statements like these fit the narrow
category discussed in Giles.103 So, even if statements like these
were considered testimonial under the “primary purpose” test,
there is evidence that the Court believes such statements should
still be admitted as evidence because they are simply immune to
the Confrontation Clause.104 Thus, Clark stands for allowing
statements from children to another regarding abuse as not
testimonial through the primary purpose test and also because
they may not violate the Confrontation Clause.105 The only
remaining obstacle is hearsay. To better understand the impact
that all of this will have on child abuse investigations,
understanding CACs and their role in investigations is
imperative. Therefore, a general explanation of CACs is
important to understand how testimonial evidence fits in child
abuse investigations, and how Clark has fundamentally changed
the landscape of child abuse investigations and prosecution.
III. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE CHILDREN’S
ADVOCACY CENTER

The problems are legion when attempting to prosecute a
sexual abuse case involving a minor.106 In fact, it is hard to
imagine a more difficult evidentiary scenario than the generic
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Trial of Joseph Fyson, THE OLD BAILEY PROCEEDINGS
ONLINE, 1674–1913, https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/ (last visited Sep. 17,
2017).
103. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358–59 (2008).
104. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).
105. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180–81 (2015).
106.
See, e.g., Laurie Shanks, Child Sexual Abuse: Moving Toward a
Balanced and Rational Approach to the Cases Everyone Abhors, 34 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 517, 522–23 (2011); Dione Marie Enea, Justice for Our
Children: New Jersey Addresses Evidentiary Problems Inherent in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2030, 2031 (1994).
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child sexual abuse case. Typically, the abuse happens in private,
and the offender requires no extra equipment or tools to commit
the crime. Often, there is no documentation, paper trail, online
activity, phone tower pings, or any other trackable activity, and no
other witness besides the victim.107 Evidence of trauma to the
victim or other medical findings are rare,108 and evidence at the
scene of the crime can be easily cleaned up without suspicion.
Evidence at trial may be only the perpetrator’s story against the
victim’s. Victims of sexual abuse are often not ideal witnesses
because they are more likely to suffer from high anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), poor self-esteem,
and
behavioral issues.109 Moreover, it can take several years for a
case to go to trial. The long wait affects children more
significantly than adults because a two-year wait is a
proportionately shorter time for a thirty-year-old than a ten-yearold.110 The myriad of agencies involved in child abuse
investigations further complicate the process. An investigation
can involve schools, pediatricians, mental health professionals,
local law enforcement, child welfare organizations, and a
prosecutor’s office. All these organizations have their own
competing interests and goals.111
To combat the problems inherent in a child abuse
investigation, Bud Cramer—a prosecutor from Alabama—founded

107.
See Enea, supra note 106, at 2031.
108.
WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDELINES FOR MEDICO-LEGAL CARE FOR
VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE: CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 78–80 (2003),
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/resources/publications/en/guid
elines_chap7.pdf.
109.
See Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett, Linda Meyer Williams, & David
Finklehor, Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children: A Review and Synthesis of
Recent Empirical Studies, 113 AM. PSYCHOL. STUD. PSYCHOL. BULL. 164, 165–
67 (1993).
110.
A two-year wait is only one-fifteenth of the lifetime of a thirty-yearold, while that same wait is one-fifth of the life of a ten-year-old. Further, an
adult has finished development, while a child is still developing emotionally,
cognitively, and physically. Therefore, two years covers much more ground
for a ten-year-old than a thirty-year-old.
111.
For instance, a school will want the child back in class, while law
enforcement may need the child for investigatory purposes. The Department
of Human Services will work toward reunification of the family, while the
prosecutor, pediatrician, and law enforcement may want to keep the family
apart.
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the first multi-disciplinary team (MDT) and CAC in 1985.112 An
MDT is a group of professionals who agree to work alongside each
other on child abuse cases. Typically, cases involving child abuse
involve multiple agencies such as: the Department of Justice, the
Department of Human Services, law enforcement, mental health
providers, victim advocates, and others. To reduce needlessly
duplicative work and re-interviewing of victims and witnesses,
agencies formed MDTs to encourage greater efficiency for their
cases and to improve the family’s experience throughout the
investigation process.113 Importantly, these agencies work
together even though their goals might be different. One agency
might be focused on reunifying the family, while another might
believe keeping the family apart is best.
From that first CAC established in Alabama, an entire model
was developed for these centers, and now there are 822 CACs
nationwide who served 324,602 children in 2016.114 CACs are
child-friendly facilities that bring all the agencies involved with
child abuse cases under one roof.115 CACs work with children and
families who were exposed to violence by offering services such as:
child advocacy, forensic interviewing, medical treatment, and
therapeutic services.116 By providing services to families and
investigative agencies, CACs serve as neutral, third-party
organizations that offer support to the community. While the
CAC model was developed by a prosecutor and most CACs share
information with prosecutors, CACs are not investigatory agencies
and do not conduct investigations of their own.117
Generally, the CAC becomes involved in situations where
abuse is suspected early in the process.118 The first step in a child
112.
NAT’L CHILD.’S ADVOC. CTR., http://www.nationalcac.org/history/ (last
visited Sep. 17, 2017).
113.
See NAT’L CHILD.’S ALL., STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITED MEMBERS 12
(2017), http://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/sites/default/files/downloads/
NCA-Standards-for-Accredited-Members-2017.pdf.
114.
NAT’L CHILD.’S ALL., http://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/ (last
visited Sep. 17, 2017).
115.
NAT’L CHILD.’S ALL., SNAPSHOT 2017: ADVOCACY, EFFICACY, AND
FUNDING IN CACS 3–4 (2016), http://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/sites/
default/files/downloads/Snapshot-2017.pdf.
116.
Id.
117.
See id.
118.
The following information about the early response process is a
generalization of a nationwide process that the author learned about during
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abuse investigation is the initial report. This happens in many
ways, but reports of abuse either from a teacher, police officer, or
otherwise somehow eventually find their way to a child abuse
hotline. If the report is accepted for investigation, the information
will be sent to either child protective services, law enforcement, or
both, and an investigation will be initiated. At this point, the
investigators refer the child and his or her caregivers to the CAC,
and set up an appointment for whatever services are appropriate.
Those services might be a forensic interview, child advocacy,
medical examination, crisis intervention, or something else
depending on each individual CAC. After the visit to the CAC, the
investigation continues, and the child may never return to the
CAC again.119 Because the CAC’s role begins so early in the
investigation process, the events that brought the child there are
relatively fresh. The purpose of discussing the ways in which CAC
staff members may be able to acquire forensic evidence is not to
change the focus of their jobs. But CAC employees should be
aware of ways in which they may come across evidence that may
be nontestimonial—or even not excluded by the hearsay rule—
while they go about the usual requirements of their jobs.
A. Child Advocates
Like any advocate, a child advocate’s job is somewhat
amorphous. Advocates are asked to support the child or family in
many different ways, which is largely dictated by the needs of
those specific people. With that in mind, a guide is helpful to
explain the duties of an advocate and the other roles at CACs.
The National Children’s Alliance (NCA) is the body that
establishes accreditation standards for all CACs across the
country, which are used to understand the requirements of each
position.120 The purpose of the child advocate is to provide
support to the child or caregiver by coordinating services through
the CAC or outside agencies and to provide up-to-date information

his experience working for a CAC. A visual depiction of the investigation
process is available at: http://www.nationalchildrensalliance.org/cac-model.
119.
See, e.g., DAY ONE R.I., CHILD.’S ADVOC. CTR., MULTI-DISCIPLINARY
TEAM (MDT) PROTOCOL 5–6 (2012), https://www.dayoneri.org/sites/default/
files/site-content/pdfs/MDT%20Protocol%202012%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
120.
STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITED MEMBERS, supra note 113, at 6, 20.
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on the investigation.121 Child advocates provide—among other
services—crisis intervention, risk assessment, safety planning,
education, and courtroom support, if necessary.122 While
interacting with clients at the CAC, advocates can be the
recipients of spontaneous disclosures of abuse, but advocates can
also elicit disclosures from their clients. However, using the
“primary purpose” test demonstrates that neither of those
disclosures should be considered testimonial evidence.123
Under the “primary purpose” test, evidence is testimonial if
“the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”124
A child advocate may need to ask the child questions that could
lead to statements about abuse in order to provide services like
safety planning, risk assessment, or referrals to outside agencies.
For instance, the advocate may ask about familial relationships at
home in an effort to understand family dynamics or to determine
appropriate therapeutic referrals. If the child makes a subsequent
disclosure of abuse by one of those family members, that does not
change the primary purpose of the question by the advocate.
Further, “all relevant circumstances” must be considered to
determine the primary purpose of the statements, and the
informality of the situation or the presence of an ongoing
emergency are some of the pertinent factors.125 A child advocate’s
meeting with the child or caregivers at the CAC is a casual
conversation.126 The CAC building itself is child-friendly and
informal, and the conversation is not video or audio recorded.127
There are no specific requirements for those conversations.128
Further, a child advocate is not a law enforcement officer, so
statements to an advocate are “much less likely to be
testimonial.”129 Determining whether an ongoing emergency
exists will be case specific because sometimes children are rushed
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
28.
129.

See id. at 25.
See id. at 26–27.
See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2180–81 (2015).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (2015).
Id.
Id.
See STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITED MEMBERS, supra note 113, at 15, 25–
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
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to the CAC within hours of the abuse, though in some cases, a
child comes to a CAC years after the abuse. Thus, looking at
these factors together, a conversation between a child, his or her
caregivers, and an advocate—even if that advocate asks questions
that cause disclosures of abuse from the child—is not primarily for
“creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.”130
Therefore, advocates should feel free to ask questions that are
related to the goals of their job, knowing that the information
provided by victims is nontestimonial.
B. SANE Nurses131
Given that nurses are more ubiquitous than other CAC
positions, their primary role is more easily understood. Moreover,
nurses who also obtain evidence during the course of their
treatment have been examined by a few courts after Clark and
survived scrutiny.132 In Barker, the court determined “[t]he
primary purpose of the conversation between [the SANE nurse]
and [the victim] was to medically evaluate and treat the young
girl.”133 Therefore, the circumstances of the abuse were relevant
for the nurse’s questioning for determining if the child would be
discharged into the child abuser’s custody.134 The court found
that a hospital emergency room had some formality associated
with it, but did not rise to the level of a police interrogation.135
Furthermore, the court found a nurse/patient relationship differed
significantly from a citizen/police relationship.136 Ultimately, the
court ruled that the “[nurse’s] SANE certification did not convert
the essential purpose of her conversation with [victim] from
medical evaluation and treatment to evidence collection, though it
may have tended to lead to Barker’s prosecution.”137 In Ward, the
130. See id. at 2180 (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822
(2006)).
131. For clarity sake, SANE nurses are a specific type of forensic nurse.
There is little difference in this context, so the terms should be read
interchangeably.
132. See United States v. Barker, 820 F.3d 167, 172 (2016); Ward v. State,
50 N.E.3d 752, 760–61 (2016).
133. Barker, 820 F.3d at 171.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 172.
136. See id.
137. Id.
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court ruled that a forensic nurse’s auxiliary purpose of finding
evidence did not make the victim’s statements to her nurse
testimonial.138 A forensic nurse at a CAC is no different.
However, Ward has one admonition about testimonial hearsay
and interviews with forensic nurses.139 Ward warns against
strategically using a medical interview as a “pretext[]” and
“backdoor for admitting what is really testimonial hearsay.”140
This seems like an obvious point, but the application may be
easier said than done.
Consider State v. McLaughlin, where a fifteen-year-old boy
made allegations of sexual abuse against a family friend.141 The
child went to a local CAC and had a medical interview and
evaluation with a registered nurse before having a medical
examination with a doctor.142 The initial medical interview was
video and audio recorded, and the child disclosed, among other
things, details of his sexual abuse, the identity of the abuser, and
places where the abuse occurred.143 The recording of the
interview was later introduced into evidence.144 Over objections
based on the Confrontation Clause, the trial court admitted the
evidence and the appellate court upheld the ruling.145 In
examining the surrounding circumstances, the appellate court
found that the age of the child—fifteen—did not mean that he
would reasonably know that his statements might be later used at
trial.146 Moreover, the primary purpose of the nurse’s questions
was the victim’s physical health, mental health, and safety.147
138. Ward v. State, 50 N.E.3d 752, 760 (2016) (“medically relevant
information is not transformed into ‘testimony’ when it is reported to a
forensic nurse instead of a paramedic.”).
139. See id. at 764.
140. Id.
141. See 786 S.E.2d 269, 273–74 (N.C. App. 2016).
142. See id. at 274.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 275.
145. See id. at 283.
146. See id. at 281; see also State v. Brigman, 632 S.E.2d 498, 506–07
(N.C. App. 2006) (holding that a reasonable child under the age of three
“would [not] know or should [not] know that his statements might later be
used at trial.”).
147. McLaughlin, 786 S.E.2d at 281. The court held that knowing what
had happened was useful to “make sure [the victim] did not have any
diseases or other issues that could affect him for the rest of his life.” Id.
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Questions posed by the nurse that were not pertinent to medical
diagnosis were admitted because they were useful for establishing
rapport and the importance of honest answers to sensitive
questions.148 Importantly, the court invoked the Supreme Court’s
broad definition of an “ongoing emergency” in Clark and deemed
the nurse’s questions as necessary to determine, among other
things, how to protect someone else from child sexual abuse.149
Because the questions were asked during an ongoing emergency
and were primarily about protecting a child, they were considered
nontestimonial.150 As such, under this interpretation of
testimonial evidence, a nurse’s questions are admissible under two
circumstances: first, if the questions are related to the physical
and mental well-being of a child, and second, if the questions are
not medically related, but are important for establishing a rapport
with the victim.151 It is not even determinative that the nurse
knew her interview would be turned over to law enforcement
because the “primary purpose” test turns on whether the
interviewer’s primary purpose was to create a substitute for incourt testimony.152 Moreover, a nurse’s primary function is not to
collect evidence.153 A forensic nurse is not assigned to uncover
and prosecute criminal behavior; therefore, statements made to
her are “significantly less likely to be testimonial.”154 This
language gives wide latitude to nurses in North Carolina, and
ammunition to prosecutors everywhere. No matter where a nurse
practices, the initial post-Clark judicial responses strongly
indicate victim statements made to a medical professional are
likely to be considered nontestimonial. Prosecutors should not be
concerned about the admissibility of statements made by patients
of SANE nurses at CACs, even if a nurse asks detailed questions
about abuse.

148. See id. at 281.
149. See id.
150. See id. Further, it was not hearsay, but hearsay is not the focus of
this Comment. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 282.
153. See INT’L ASS’N OF FORENSIC NURSES, http://www.forensicnurses.org/
?page=whatisfn (last visited Sep. 17, 2017) (“Forensic nurses are nurses first
and foremost.”).
154. Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2182 (2015).
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C. Forensic Interviewers
A forensic interviewer is someone who talks to a suspected
child abuse victim. Forensic interviewers have
specialized
training for how to question children in ways that are non-leading
and developmentally appropriate. Depending on the jurisdiction,
forensic interviewers might have an advanced degree or a
bachelor’s degree, and may work as an interviewer full or part
time. Forensic interviews tend to be conversational, meaning they
are not scripted. When it comes to eliciting nontestimonial
evidence, forensic interviewers have not fared as well as SANE
nurses post-Clark.155 And forensic interviews certainly were not
welcomed by the courts with open arms before Clark.156 There
are two main reasons why forensic interviews have typically
produced statements that courts have categorized as testimonial.
First, many decisions about interviews came before Clark and
second, courts often misunderstood the role of forensic
interviewers. Clark changed the formulation for determining if
evidence is testimonial, and it reduced what information is
considered testimonial.157 Therefore, guidelines for what
constitutes nontestimonial evidence was stricter before Clark.
Second, a misunderstanding of forensic interviewers’ roles is an
understandable mistake. Forensic interviewing is an esoteric job.
Even within interviewing, different interviewers may have
different ideas about how to best fulfill their duties. Within any
occupation, workers may believe, correctly or not, that certain
responsibilities are more important than others. For instance, in
State v. Bentley, a child asked a forensic interviewer if she could
stop the interview.158 The interviewer refused, and told the child,
155.
See In the Interest of J.C., 877 N.W.2d 447, 458 (Iowa 2016) (where
the Iowa Supreme Court assumed that a forensic interview violated the
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights because it was called a “forensic
interview,” the referral came from law enforcement, and the interview was
recorded).
156.
See, e.g., People v. Sharp, 155 P.3d 577, 579 (Colo. App. 2006)
(videotaped interview with forensic interview deemed testimonial); State v.
Bentley, 739 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Iowa 2007) (interview by counselor observed
by law enforcement ruled testimonial); State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 564
(N.D. 2006) (statements to private forensic interviewer who was working
with police were testimonial).
157. See 135 S. Ct. 2173.
158. 739 N.W.2d at 300.
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“it’s just really important the police know about everything that
happened.”159 Even worse, the interviewer asked for additional
details because the police were “probably going to want to know
just a little bit more.”160 When courts encounter a forensic
interviewer who presents her role like the one in Bentley did, it is
reasonable for the court to conclude that the primary purpose of
forensic interviews is to investigate solely on behalf of the
police.161 However, that is not an accurate representation of a
forensic interviewer. The NCA explains that a forensic
interviewer’s responsibility is “to obtain information from a child
about abuse allegations that will support accurate and fair
decision making by the MDT within the criminal justice, child
protection, and service delivery systems.”162 Therefore, while it is
true that part of the function of an interviewer is investigative,
the NCA’s definition supports a broader scope for the job. The
NCA’s definition may allow the MDT to make fair and accurate
decisions that only pertain to child protection and service delivery
for the child. A forensic interviewer can conduct an interview that
disregards the criminal justice aspect of the MDT. Further, to
have an investigative component to their responsibilities does not
mean that forensic interviews should be categorically considered
testimonial. As has been the case since Davis v. Washington, the
“primary purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”163 Prosecution
is not the ultimate goal for a CAC or a forensic interview. The
best expression of this main goal is from CornerHouse, one of the
premier
international
organizations
assisting
CACs.164
CornerHouse advocates the “Child First Philosophy”: “The child is
our first priority. Not the needs of the family. Not the child’s
‘story.’ Not the evidence. Not the needs of the courts. Not the
needs of police, child protection, attorneys, etc. The child is our
first priority.”165 Therefore, the forensic interviewer also collects
information for service referrals, to determine if the child is safe,
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITED MEMBERS, supra note 113, at 20.
163. 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (emphasis added).
164. CORNERHOUSE,
http://www.cornerhousemn.org/about.html
visited Sep. 17, 2017).
165. Id.

(last
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and whether it is safe to release the child to their guardian. This
is substantively the same reasoning the Court used to justify the
teachers’ questions in Clark.166 That forensic interviewers’
questions have a natural tendency to result in prosecutions is
“irrelevant.”167 Even though an interviewer knows
the
information might be used in court, the statements do not become
testimonial. Forensic interviewers could be analyzed in the same
way as forensic nurses. They both perform functions primarily for
the child’s wellbeing and their actions may benefit investigators,
but neither are principally charged with uncovering and
prosecuting criminal behavior. Both have the word “forensic” in
their title, but that word only modifies their title, it is not the
other way around.168
Additionally, forensic interviewers want to support good
decision making by the MDT, but are not beholden to the wishes
of the MDT. A forensic interviewer is ultimately responsible for
the interview that she conducts, so while she may seek advice
from observers of the interview, she is not required to ask
questions the team may want. Forensic interviewers work for the
CAC, not the MDT, not law enforcement, and not the prosecutor’s
office. Interviewers should take caution to make this distinction
clear. Forensic interviewers have their own responsibility to make
sure that their interviews adhere to the goals of their own job title
and do not stray into impermissible territory. Interviewers should
be careful in how they consult their team when an interview is
ongoing. Specifically, if the MDT wants the interviewer to ask a
question that is inappropriate—for whatever reason—the
interviewer is under no obligation to ask that question and should
not ask that question. Some interviewers choose to use an
earpiece when they are interviewing a child. The earpiece is
connected to a microphone in the room where the MDT is
observing the interview. This can be helpful for interviews that
are detail-rich because an interviewer might miss something that
the team would like clarification about later in the interview. But
166. See Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015) (“Because the
teachers needed to know whether it was safe to release [the child] to his
guardian at the end of the day, they needed to determine who might be
abusing the child.”).
167. See id. at 2183.
168. See INT’L ASS’N OF FORENSIC NURSES, supra note 153.
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interviewers should ensure that they are still screening questions
from the MDT appropriately. Earpieces should not turn the
interviewer into merely a conduit through which the police ask
questions. An interviewer who allows this would destroy the line
between a police interview and a forensic interview. Some
jurisdictions require the forensic interviewer to administer an
oath that the child will tell the truth.169 These oaths may be
necessary in some communities, but they will increase the
likelihood that forensic interviews will produce testimonial
evidence. Some jurisdictions require law enforcement to be
present before an interview is conducted, this would also increase
the likelihood that an interview will create testimonial evidence.
These jurisdictional choices are not required to conduct a forensic
interview; a perfectly competent interview may be conducted
without an oath, earpiece, or presence of law enforcement.
An objective examination of the circumstances does not show
that a proper forensic interview is conducted primarily to create
an out-of-court substitute for testimony. Assuming a forensic
interview as primarily investigative because it is recorded and
observed by investigators exhibits a superficial understanding of
the process. An interview is supposed to support accurate and fair
decision making by the team.170 A forensic interview may be the
starting point of the team’s investigation, but it is not the entirety
of it. It is the investigators’ job to corroborate or disprove the
allegations made in an interview. The interviewer has no part in
any of the future investigation. Her training is to gather
information in a developmentally appropriate way. That
information may be used in an investigation, but it may also be
just as useful to mental health clinicians, medical providers, or
support services. Therefore, statements made to forensic
interviewers who are part of the CAC—a non-investigative
agency—are significantly less likely to be testimonial than
statements made to law enforcement.171
169. See, e.g., State v. Dearing, 34 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012)
(where the victim was administered an oath twice agreeing to tell the truth);
State v. Love, No. E2015-02297-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1077062, at *12
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2017) (where the child was administered an oath
to tell the truth).
170. See STANDARDS FOR ACCREDITED MEMBERS, supra note 113, at 20.
171. See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182.
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CONCLUSION

Think back to Ashley. Try to look at the abuse allegation she
made to her parents from a layperson’s perspective. As a matter
of common sense, her remarks seem appropriate for a jury’s
consideration. Ultimately, the question is about what information
should be admitted in court if the child cannot testify on her own
behalf. Under Crawford, if Ashley was unable to testify, her
statements had no chance of being admitted.172 Davis lends little
help to Ashley and her family because the “primary purpose” test
is used only during an ongoing emergency.173 It would be hard to
argue that driving home on a Sunday afternoon is the kind of
emergency comparable to the attacks of an abusive partner.
Bryant cracks the door open slightly to allow the examination of
“all relevant circumstances.”174 This is the first framework that
would even entertain a potential argument for the introduction of
Ashley’s disclosure. The problem with stopping at Bryant and all
of the previous “testimonial” cases is that they provide almost no
protection or opportunity for justice for Ashley and children like
her. A three-year-old is not suited for courtroom testimony, and
there are few other ways to establish guilt, which is why
convictions are difficult to obtain. Therefore, young children can
be easily targeted by those who wish to do them harm because
criminal consequences are rare. However, the families are not
shielded from the knowledge of the disclosure, so they endure all
the pain and familial dysfunction of abuse without a realistic
chance to get their day in court. This is an unacceptable position
for children and their caregivers. It is easy to overstate what
Clark accomplished. Clark only decided that statements by
children to third-parties who are not law enforcement are
significantly less likely to be testimonial.175 Clark also reminds
us that there is evidence to support that statements by children
about child abuse were never intended to violate the Sixth
Amendment.176 But ultimately, Clark makes no per se rule, it
172. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (her statements
appear to be a “solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of
establishing or proving some fact.” (citation omitted)).
173. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
174. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 369–70 (2011).
175. See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2181.
176. Id. at 2182.
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takes no stance on weight, and it says nothing about hearsay.
Regardless, Clark is an important step to provide more access to
justice for a group that can do little on their own. Clark empowers
others to better support children through the rigorous court
process. Sometimes laws create barriers to justice, but in this
case, the Supreme Court has formulated a framework that will
encourage justice. As a result, children will be better protected for
generations to come.

